Abstract This study analyzes the cooperative coalition problem for formation scheduling based on incomplete information. A multi-agent cooperative coalition framework is developed to optimize the formation scheduling problem in a decentralized manner. The social class differentiation mechanism and role-assuming mechanism are incorporated into the framework, which, in turn, ensures that the multi-agent system (MAS) evolves in the optimal direction. Moreover, a further differentiation pressure can be achieved to help MAS escape from local optima. A Bayesian coalition negotiation algorithm is constructed, within which the Harsanyi transformation is introduced to transform the coalition problem based on incomplete information to the Bayesian-equivalent coalition problem based on imperfect information. The simulation results suggest that the distribution of agents' expectations of other agents' unknown information approximates to the true distribution after a finite set of generations. The comparisons indicate that the MAS cooperative coalition algorithm produces a significantly better utility and possesses a more effective capability of escaping from local optima than the proposal-engaged marriage algorithm and the Simulated Annealing algorithm.
Introduction
The continuous growth of air traffic flow has created an energy and environmental crisis, which has aroused global concerns.
According to the international airport association, the passenger demand is expected to reach 9.1 billion and cargo demand 214 million tons in 2025, which in turn will result in 1.4 billion tons of CO 2 emissions, 1 increasing concerns for energy demand and environment crisis. In 2009, the European Union created its long-term vision on reducing CO 2 emissions to half of the 2005 level by 2050. 2 The Chinese government has also promised to reduce CO 2 emissions to 45%-50% of the 2005 level by 2020. The aviation sector will inevitably be forced to reduce its share of emissions. Formation flight has been widely recognized as one of the most promising coping strategies due to its potential for reducing fuel use. NASA, Airbus, Boeing and other researchers have pioneered studies regarding aerodynamic theory and the fuel economy of extended formation flying in the commercial aviation sector. [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] Formation scheduling problems have become the focus of these studies. Scheduling is typically described as when, where and with whom flights are scheduled to join a formation, with the objective being to minimize overall fuel costs. The formation flight paths must be created in advance to evaluate the fuel economy of a specific schedule. Therefore, the formation scheduling and path planning problems are highly correlated and solved simultaneously. The formation scheduling problem is based on the recursive weighted geodesic steiner minimum tree (WGSMT) constructing problem. However, because no exact analytical solution of the WGSMT Steiner point problem exists, 9 a numerical solution technique will cause the problem to become exponentially complex. Ribichini and Frazzoil formulated the problem as three related sub-problems, presented a multi-agent coalition algorithm and solved it via the greedy method. 10 Bower et al. optimized the formation path by using the Nelder-Mead Simplex algorithm. 11 Kent and Richards built a mixed integer programming model for large-scale formation scheduling and solved it based on Simulated Annealing. 12 Later, they incorporated wind impacts into the model. 13 Recently, Xu et al. developed a bi-level formation flight path planning framework in which heterogeneous aircraft drag models are involved. They also significantly reduced the problem's complexity by restricting the search space inside the intersections of all the candidate flight performance and fuel-efficiency envelopes.
14, 15 Xu et al. presented a mathematical model of the formation path planning problem along with related geometric deductions. 16 Previous research has mainly been conducted under the assumption of complete information. The inherent complexity of the problem, which is induced by geodesic measurements, is seldom considered. In this paper, we focus on the intercontinental commercial formation scheduling problem based on incomplete information. In Section 2, we give the problem description and model it using a recursive WGSMT construction problem. An approximate analytical solution of the WGSMT Steiner point problem is derived to reduce the problem's complexity. In Section 3, a cooperative coalition framework is developed to treat the problem in a decentralized manner. We also propose a coalition negotiation algorithm based on incomplete information. We then make comparisons to verify the validity and efficiency of our algorithm. Finally, we present our conclusions and suggestions for future work in Section 5.
Mathematical formulation

Problem formulation
In our previous work, the formation flight scheduling problem was developed from the WGSMT construction problem, as was a detailed description of the mathematical model. 16 A formation path includes departures, rendezvous points, breakaway points and arrivals, which are connected by geodesic lines 11 ( Fig. 1) . Based on the assumption that only two fleets are scheduled to join the formation at a rendezvous point and separate from the formation at a breakaway point, 12 the degree of all rendezvous points and breakaway points is exactly 3. Therefore, the formation path can be represented by a WGSMT tree, T(D, R, B, A, W), spanning the departure set, D = {d i |i = 1,2,. . ., m}, and the arrival set, A = {a j | j = 1,2,. . ., n} (Fig. 2 ) 12, 16 . The rendezvous point set, R = {r i |i = 1,2,. . ., m À 1}, and the breakaway point set, B = {b j | i = 1,2,. . ., n À 1}, are Steiner point sets. W is the arc weight set, which is determined by fleet size. The objective is to minimize the total weighted geodesic distance of T(D, R, B, A, W) by optimizing the formation schedule.
Based on the topological features of the formation path, the construction of T(D, R, B, A, W) can be redefined as recursively constructing
. ., n (k))} is the formation set and n(k) is the number of formations at generation k.
To quantify the fuel economy of formation flight, we introduce the equivalent range as where
is the relative range defined by the ratio of the fuel mileage flying in a formation relative to that flying solo;
is the equivalent range from o i (k) to g i (k) and ''ff" represents ''formation flight".
At k > 0, all possible 2-member formations in T(k) are scheduled to minimize the overall equivalent range: 
where 0 6 e i < 1 is the minimum expected utility factor of flight or fleet i and it is not known to others. Therefore the formation scheduling problem is based on incomplete knowledge. (2) Maximum allowed formation size. Any fleet's size must not be greater than the maximum allowable formation size, q max , ensuring that no unintentional formation breakaway will occur due to cumulative tracking errors due to possible turns.
q i ðkÞ 6 q max ; 8i 2 FðkÞ ð 6Þ
Once the scheduling matrix DðkÞ ¼ ½d hi;ji ðkÞ is solved, T(k) will be updated by T(k + 1) via Algorithm 1.
Step 
Formation scheduling rules
Two formation scheduling rules are considered in our framework:
(1) Cooperative rule (Fig. 3) . If i and j rendezvous into hi, ji at r hi, ji (k) and breakaway from hi, ji at b hi, ji (k), where r hi, ji (k) and b hi, ji (k) are the two WGSMT points of
The cooperative rule is fair to both sides because the rendezvous and breakaway points are determined by complete geometric rules. Each side shares the utility corresponding to its fleet size.
(2) Semi-cooperative rule (Fig. 4) . If j leave o j (k) for o i (k) to join hi, ji and break away from hi, ji at point
In this case, i gains more than it would via the cooperative rule while j gains less than it would via the cooperative rule. This is because i has no incentive to form a cooperative coalition due to unsatisfied utility. However, i would not reject a semi-cooperative rule because it gains more utility than it would via the cooperative rule without increasing any costs, compared to flying solo, while j may have no better choice than joining hi, ji at point g i (k) because of its adverse position.
Approximate analytical solution of a WGSMT Steiner point
For any three non-collinear spherical point, fAðu A ; k A Þ; Bðu B ; k B Þ; Cðu C ; k C Þg, satisfying q A + q B = q C , let Sðu S ; k S Þ be the WGSMT Steiner point (Fig. 5) . The WGSMT problem can be simplified into Cooperative coalition for formation flight scheduling based on incomplete information
Based on the K-T condition, we can obtain Eqs. (12) and (13) No exact analytical solutions exist for Eqs. (12) and (13).
< p are always true in intercontinental aviation 16 , we then have approximation Eq. (14).
Eqs. (12) and (13) can be simplified into Eqs. (15) and (16).
For any four non-collinear spherical point set, fAðu A ; k A Þ; Bðu B ; k B Þ; Cðu C ; k C Þ; Dðu D ; k D Þg, and based on the assumption that flights depart from A and B and land at C and D, so that Similarly, the approximate analytical coordinates of S CD can be calculated via Eqs. (19) and (20) .
3. Formation scheduling based on MAS cooperative coalition
A role-centered MAS cooperative coalition framework
The MAS provides an efficient framework for treating problems with dynamic interactions in a decentralized fashion, due to its outstanding capabilities in parallel and distributed computing. 20 In an open and dynamic environment, an agent has the evolutionary capability to adapt its relationship with the environment through continued interactions. 21 A large number of local interactions will form a role-centered hierarchical structure in social networks. [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] Vincent and Weesie believe that reputations and social roles have strong impacts on social structure emergence. 25 Jacques and Gutknecht further present a role-centered organization model, in which the concepts of group, role and dependency are used to define the basic interactive framework among agents. 26 The proposal-engaged marriage model is a MAS model that is directly related to formation flight scheduling. 10 In the model, a commitment to form a formation is deemed an engagement, while a request to join a formation is a proposal. Each agent deliberates its negotiation based on the greedy method and within a predefined communication radius. Directed by these philosophies, a cooperative coalition framework, with the objective of forming a role-centered hierarchical MAS structure that is faithful to the structure of formation path, is developed to optimize formation schedules. The framework and algorithm was inspired by the proposal-engaged marriage algorithm, to which the social class differentiation and roleassuming mechanisms were introduced.
In our framework, a formation in the framework is a coalition. Coalition forming negotiations are always initiated by powerful airlines with high social reputations, while those with low social reputations have either the right to decide whether to agree upon forming a cooperative coalition or to initiate a negotiation to form a semi-cooperative coalition. The coalition is recursively conducted until a maximum coalition size has been reached, which can be due to capacity or unacceptable utility bounds. 28 The terminology used to describe our framework is defined as follows.
(1) Social classes: elite, everyman. The elite class has a high social reputation. Its associated cooperative utility will be optimistic for the majority of agents. The everyman class has a low social reputation. Its associated cooperative utility may not be very optimistic for the majority of agents. At the beginning of each generation, agents are differentiated into elites and everymen based on their social reputations.
The social reputation is calculated by the agent's fleet size, or resource, and the aspect ratio, which is defined by the ratio of its lateral deviation from the geometric center to its equivalent range. where ð OðkÞ; GðkÞÞ denotes the geometric center of all agents positions at generation k. A higher resource amount and lower aspect ratio contribute to a better reputation and consequently a higher social class. Agents are differentiated into elites and everymen based on the following rule:
If the variation of an agent's reputation from the average reputation of all agents is not less than the standard variation of all agents reputations timed by a generalization factor, vðkÞ 2 ½À1; 1, it will then be differentiated as elite. Otherwise, it will be differentiated as everyman. The generalization factor is updated by vðkÞ ¼ vðk À 1Þ À ld v , and d v 2 ð0; 1Þ is the step size of vðkÞ, ensuring that a minimum amount of differentiation pressure always exists among agents. l > 1 is the regulator used to adjust the step size of the generalization factor.
(2) Agent behavior: recruit, enlist, follow, accommodate.
Agents possess different authority levels corresponding to their social classes. Agents of the same class are not allowed to form a coalition. Therefore negotiations are only conducted between elite and everyman. Elite has the authority to recruit an everyman to form a cooperative coalition, or to accommodate an everyman to form a semi-cooperative coalition. Everyman has the authority to enlist an elite to form a cooperative coalition, or to follow an elite to form a semi-cooperative coalition. (3) Agent roles: leader, cooperator, volunteer. In a coalition, elite is assumed to be leader, while everyman is cooperator in a cooperative coalition and volunteer in a semi-cooperative coalition. When a coalition is formed between two agents, their state vectors, i.e. position vectors in formation scheduling problem, will be updated based on the rules stated in Section 2.2.
We model an agent as i = (o i (k), g i (k), q i (k), c i (k)) with its current position o i (k), goal-reachable position g i (k), resource q i (k) and social class c i (k). A cooperative coalition is modeled by hi, ji = (leader = i, cooperator = j, volunteer = null, resource = q i (k) + q j (k)), while a semi-cooperative coalition is modeled by hi, ji = (leader = i, cooperator = null, volunteer = j, resource = q i (k) + q j (k)). If we consider an agent, i, flying solo as a coalition hi, nulli = (leader = i, cooperator = null, volunteer = null, resource = q i (k)), then we have the uniformed description of a coalition. Let GROUP(k) be the coalition set and AGT(k) be the agent set at generation k. Our framework can be programmed using Algorithm 2. 
Step 2. AGT(k) is differentiated into an elite set, I(k), and an everyman set, J(k), based on the social reputations of all the agents.
Step 3. Coalition negotiations are conducted between agents from I(k) and J(k) based on Algorithm 3.
Step
Otherwise, if a semi-cooperative coalition, hi, ji, is formed, update the coalition state vectors based on Algorithm 1 and execute,
Step 5. If at least two agents are involved in the coalition process, go to Step 1. Otherwise, terminate the coalition process.
Class differentiation and role assuming mechanisms are incorporated into our framework to assure that MAS evolves in optimal directions, which are dominated by elites. A dynamic decreasing generalization factor, vðkÞ, will cause MAS to escape from local optima.
Formation coalition negotiations based on incomplete information
Although cooperation utilities, which are calculated based on common rules, make each individual's utilities public information, agents do not know if their proposals will be accepted by their preferred partners. Therefore, the minimum utility each agent will accept and the strategy each uses are private beliefs. 29 Thus, the formation coalition problem can be formulated as a cooperative game based on incomplete information. The Harsanyi transformation builds the fundamental framework for playing games based on incomplete information. [30] [31] [32] By using the Harsanyi transformation, the original game with incomplete information can be transformed to the Bayesianequivalent game with imperfect information. The imperfect information is expressed by the subjective confidence level of the opponent's utility and strategy types, as based on each player's expectations.
Consider the formation coalition problem G:(I,J,E,P,X), with m elites and n everymen, and where I = {i = 1, 2,. . .,m} and J = {j = 1,2,. . .,n} each separately denotes the elite set and the everyman set. E = [e l , e h ] is the range space of the minimum expected utility factors of all the agents. P = [0,1] is the strategy type range space for all the agents, where 0 denotes non-cooperative and 1 denotes cooperative. X = {cooperative, semi-cooperative} is the formation scheduling rules space defined in Section 2.2. An agent's utility factor, e hi;ji i , in coalition hi, ji is, is i's cost of flying solo. e i 2 E is i's minimum expected utility factor and p i -2P is i's strategy type. A non-cooperative agent will always try to maximize its own utility. A cooperative agent will attempt to maximize the utilities of its partners on the premise that its utility factor is not less than its minimum expected utility factor. x 2 X = {cooperative, semi-cooperative} denotes the rule of forming coalition hi, ji. Agent i's utility function in coalition hi, ji can be mathematically expressed as In the formation scheduling coalition problem, the utility and strategy types of each agent are unknown to others. This section attempts to transform G:(I,J,E,P,X) based on incomplete information into G * :(I,J,E * ,P * ,X) with imperfect information via the Harsanyi transformation. 30, 31 The key to the Harsanyi transformation is that each agent assigns and updates its subjective probabilities of other agent's unknown parameters based on their individual expectations. When this task is completed, agents can then assess their utilities in all possible coalitions and deliberate their negotiation sets based on a Bayesian approach. In our framework, agents believe that other agents' unknown information initially obeys a basic probability distribution. Subsequently, the probability distribution of the unknown information changes over time based on observing the negotiation outcomes in each negotiation round.
Let P ¼ ½p E ; p P T ¼ ½ðp If i is rejected by j, there are two primitive independent causes, A and B, contributing to the event, deemed a fail, where (1) Because fAB; A B; AB; A Bg constitutes a partition of the complete causes set of a fail event, agent i can revise its expectation of the probability distribution of j's unknown information using Eq. (24) . If i receives a follow proposal from j, and j is not in i's negotiation set, there will be two primitive independent causes, C and D, contributing to this event, deemed an omit, where:
(1) C is interpreted as ''the membership grade of j's minimum expected utility factor belonging to e l is underestimated by d e , and that belonging to Because fCD; C D; CD; C Dg constitutes a partition of the complete causes set of an omit event, agent i can revise its expectation of the probability distribution of j's unknown information using Eq. (25) .
The original coalition problem, G, can now be transformed into G * , within which each agent plays with a virtual agent of a different class who conducts a lottery in accordance with its expectation of the probability of j's unknown information. 31, 32 In the G * coalition game, i calculates its negotiation set using Bayesian rationality via the following rule:
If both e hi;ji i P e i and e hi;ji j P e Ã jji hold, then j is i's rational negotiation partner.where e Ã jji is j's minimum expected utility factor based on i's expectation.
However, i does not know if j will accept the proposal because it does not know exactly about j's strategy type. In this case, it will calculate its risk utility in coalition hi, ji based on its own strategy type and its expectation of j's strategy type. Agent i's risk utility in coalition hi, ji can be formulated as Eq. (27) .
Agent i selects the best partner by maximizing risk utility u hi;jiÃ i . The risk utility is not the real utility that agent i might achieve in hi, ji. It is agent i's risk philosophy toward the utility it may achieve in hi, ji based on both i's strategy type and i's expectation of j's strategy type.
Algorithm 3. MAS coalition negotiation based on incomplete information For any agent i, independent of its social class,
Concurrently, reply messages from all other agents are monitored. If a message is received from j, and j is not included in NS
jji is revised based on the omit event.
Step 3. If NS Ã i is not empty, deliberate to find the best-ranking partner j in its risk utility with agents in NS Ã i using Eq. (29) .
Otherwise, go to Step 6.
Step 4. Send a recruit proposal to j if i is an elite, or a follow proposal to j if i is an everyman.
Step 5. If rejected by j , revise P Ã j ji based on the fail event. Otherwise, the hi; j i coalition is formed. Both agents in hi; j i assume their roles based on their social classes and the rules involved in forming hi; j i. For example, if i's class is elite, it assumes a leader role, while j must be everyman and assumes the cooperator role based on the cooperative rule or volunteer role based on the semi-cooperative rule.
Step 6. If the resource capacity of a coalition cannot accommodate additional agents, then quit the coalition and denote itself as ''quit".
Simulations and results
Data preparation
A set of 100 intercontinental Chinese flights was selected to verify the validity of the MAS cooperative coalition algorithm. Comparisons were also made to prove the efficiency of our framework against that of the proposal-engaged marriage algorithm and the Simulated Annealing algorithm, which represent decentralized and centralized approaches. All flights were considered to be homogeneous in our simulation. The minimum expected utility factor is assumed to be based on a normal distribution, with l e ¼ p l e e l þ p h e e h ¼ 0:1 and r e ¼ minfl e À e l ; e h À l e g to ensure that the minimum expected utility factors of all agents are distributed between 0 and 0.2, with a confidence of 0.9974. Similarly, we assume that the strategy type also obeys the normal distribution with
The uniform rejection sampling method 33 was used to generate a series of normal random numbers representing the minimum expected utility factors and strategies of all the agents. These pseudo-random numbers were subsequently transformed into the utility factor and strategy profiles based on the range spaces' lower and upper boundaries. Other simulation parameters can be seen in Table 1 .
In the MAS cooperative coalition framework, an agent is classified as elite or everyman based on its social reputation. Rational negotiations are then based on individual expectations. An agent chooses its best-ranking partner based on the strategy types of both parties, resulting in negotiations. If a fail or omit event occurs to the agent, it will revise its expectation of the rival's utility and strategy profiles. In the framework of the proposal-engaged marriage algorithm, an agent greedily chooses the best-ranking partners according to the basic distribution of the utility and strategy types of all agents, as well as its individual's utility and strategy types. An agent does not revise its expectation of a rival's utility and strategy types, and all the agents are impartially treated in the negotiation process. In the framework of the SA algorithm, the management agent optimizes all possible 2-member coalitions based on the basic distribution of the utility and strategy types of all the agents, with the Metropolis rule in each generation. An initial solution is chosen via the class differentiation mechanism, which ensures that the SA search process has appropriate initial conditions.
Simulations were conducted using Matlab 7.8. Object oriented techniques were utilized to realize each agent's properties and methods. Communications among agents were realized through the event mechanisms. 
Validity of MAS cooperative coalition algorithm
Utility, fleet size, negotiation count, count of agents with different roles and classes and agents' expectations of other agents' utility and strategy types were chosen as metrics to validate the MAS cooperative coalition algorithm. The MAS system converged at the 59th generation. Thirty-six formations were formed and a total utility of 112,619 nautical miles were achieved for 100 flights. Fig. 7 shows the resolved formation flight paths optimized via the MAS cooperative coalition algorithm. Red arcs represent formation segments, blue arcs represent rendezvous segments and breakaway segments and green arcs represent solo flight paths. Fig. 8 indicates that the elite count increases with k, while the everyman count decreases with k. This is because the differentiation pressure increases as the generalization factor decreases, which helps MAS escape from the local optima. The global optimization capability of the MAS cooperative coalition algorithm is illustrated in Figs. 9 and 10 . The first partial optimal solution was encountered at generation 3 and the solution escaped from the first local optima at generation 8. The process fluctuates until it finally converges at generation 59. Fig. 9 also shows that negotiation times decrease with k, while the acceptance rate of forming coalitions increases with k. A reasonable coalition forming acceptance rate can be achieved in our framework, although fluctuations may be present. The lowest acceptance rate is not less than 33%, and rates as high as 100% are achieved at times. This suggests that a high-precision evaluation of other agents' utility and strategy types were achieved during the MAS evolutionary process. Fig. 10 indicates that the lowest mean utility factor is not less than 0.1, while the highest mean utility factor is not larger than 0.5. This is because the relative range, as defined by Eq. (2), yields the largest utility factor of 0.5. Fig. 10 also indicates that the mean utility factor keeps varying in accordance with the mean utility early in the model, but sharply separates after generation 40. This is because the utility factor that a formation could gain is determined by (q(k) + 1)/2q(k) À (q(k À 1) + 1)/2q(k À 1) and will inevitably converge to zero. However, the absolute utility will improve as formation size increases.
Figs. 11-14 show the distributions of agents' true utility and strategy types, as well as the distribution of agents' expectations of other agents' utility and strategy types. The color-coded marks on the back-diagonal lines of each graph represent agents' true utility and strategy types. The color spectrums in these figures illustrate the values of the colorcoded marks. The off-diagonal marks represent agents' Bayesian estimations of other agents' utility and strategy types. The color intensity difference between an off-diagonal mark and a back-diagonal mark illustrates the agent's Bayesian estimation error. A high level of similarity of the color between off-diagonal marks and back-diagonal marks in Figs. 11-14 indicate the preferred approximation of Bayesian evaluation. They also explain the higher coalition formation rate, as seen in Fig. 9. 
Comparison and discussion
Comparisons are based on the mean formation size, mean utility factor, mean aircraft utility of and total fleet utility in formation to verify the advantages of the MAS cooperative coalition algorithm in solving formation scheduling problems based on incomplete information. The results were then compared to those from the proposal-engaged marriage and Simulated Annealing algorithms. Figs. [15] [16] [17] [18] indicate that the MAS cooperative algorithm yields more effective capability of escaping from local optima than the proposal-engaged marriage and Simulated Annealing algorithms. The MAS cooperative algorithm converges at generation 59, while the proposal-engaged marriage algorithm converges at generation 2 and Simulated Annealing algorithm converges at generation 1. The total utilities of the MAS cooperative coalition algorithm, the proposalengaged marriage algorithm and the Simulated Annealing algorithm are 112,619NM, 33078.15NM and 93731.89NM respectively. Therefore, the improvements of 240.46% and 20.15% were achieved using our framework.
Conclusions and future work
A MAS cooperative coalition framework was developed to optimize the formation scheduling problem in a decentralized manner. The social class differentiation and role-assuming mechanisms were introduced into the framework to differentiate agents into elites and everymen, corresponding to their social reputations. The social class differentiation mechanism assures that MAS evolves in the optimal direction. Moreover, the social class differentiation mechanism helps the MAS to escape from local optima.
A coalition negotiation algorithm was constructed to analyze the cooperative coalition problem based on incomplete information. The Harsanyi transformation was introduced to transform the coalition problem with incomplete information to the Bayesian-equivalent coalition problem with imperfect information. Each agent can improve its expectation of rival's utility and strategy types.
Our example shows that agents' expectations of the unknown information distribution of other agents will approximate to the true distribution after a finite set of generations. Our comparisons indicate that a significantly better utility can be achieved using the MAS cooperative coalition algorithm, compared to using the proposal-engaged marriage and Simulated Annealing algorithms. The comparison also shows that the MAS cooperative coalition algorithm possesses a more effective capability of escaping from local optima. This study creates a basic framework for solving commercial formation scheduling problems with incomplete information. However, uncertainties related to aerodynamic coupling and heterogeneous aircraft performance are not considered in this study. These are highly complex issues and will be studied in future research.
